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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Robert Amory, Jr.

DATE: 6 September 1952

FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1A9a

SUBJECT: OIR-ORR Relations

1. I am deeply concerned at the trend of our relations with DRS, OIR, State, and with the conclusions which may be drawn therefrom. At the risk of espousing an unpopular view, I believe we must not let individual or collective passions, however frustrating certain personal relations, obstruct the reality of events. In this regard, the following points are relevant.

2. ORR, in the past, has in many of its papers and studies been forced to play from weakness. The massive collective effort which ORR represents has been hampered by the lack of senior intelligence officers to provide substantive direction to individual projects. Too many of our senior people act as administrators who are more concerned with the mechanics of the intelligence production rather than its content. Another aspect of the problem is that analysts, in their search for the factual blocks on which to build their studies, under-emphasize the importance of coherently presenting their material and the conclusions which may be drawn from it. These weaknesses are being rectified, but in the interim, they cannot be wished away.

3. The Rubber Paper, despite all the sincere and talented effort that went into it, was a confused and poorly presented paper which failed by omission to point out the limitations of what we knew. State, galling as it was to the individuals concerned, contributed to the paper by pointing up the degree of firmness of various aspects of the analysis. Aside from the State contribution, or lack of it, the paper clearly had to be re-organized and re-drafted. I directed that this job be done in the first instance in the Branch and expected that I would redraft further when I was instructed to drop the project. This is the process that Bill is going through now. It is expecting too much to say that State should do the re-drafting necessary for a coherent presentation of the paper.

4. We must expect and learn to live, I believe, with a certain modicum of inter-agency conflict, since our activity is heavily contingent on policy considerations. The identification of inter-agency conflicts at the working level is an important EIC function. Driving State out of the Soviet economic field altogether will remove conflict from the EIC level and re-introduce it at the IAC level.

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5. The structure of inter-agency intelligence cooperation set up in 1947 insured that existing agency intelligence support arms would be left intact and empowered CIA to coordinate the support programs and fill gaps. While the formula is by no means God-given, it has survived as a modus operandi of the IAC.

6. I strongly recommend holding our fire inter-agency-wise while we continue the bootstrap operation of strengthening ORR. There is no substitute for a position of strength when the chips are down. In this regard, time and resources are with us as [redacted] have demonstrated. This view does not preclude taking a strong line with State and keeping them strictly on a put-up basis. (Parenthetically I might add that I have always advocated getting rid of Wiedemann. At the minimum, we should throw a good scare into him by protesting to Evans. I want to check Wiedemann's position in the intra-elite structure in OIR.)

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